1942-38C RCM/ld CONFIDENTIAL	HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH DEFENSE BATTALION, FLEET MARINE FORCE
		13 June, 1942

1.       The following is the chronological record of the attack on Midway on 4 June, 1942:

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2.     Summary: At 0528 aviation reported unidentified planes sighted on bearing 320 degrees, distance 100 miles. The order was given to all groups to "Open fire on all planes not identified as friendly". At 0537 the Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station reported "Enemy aircraft carrier sighted at 150 miles, 330 degrees". The enemy planes were picked up by the Navy radar at 93 miles, 310 degrees, altitude 11,000 feet at 0553. Condition One was set and air raid alarm was sounded. At 0618 friendly fighters met the enemy planes at about 25 miles, 320 degrees. All friendly planes were in the air including B-17's, Navy patrol planes, B-26's, TBF's and Marine fighters and dive bombers. The PT boats had all cleared the dock and were ready for action against low flying planes in the harbor.

3.     "D" battery picked up the enemy planes at 50,000 yards at 0622 and tracked them continuously from this time on in. All other AA gun batteries picked them up immediately after "D" battery. All units, OP's and machine guns were kept continuously informed of the position of the enemy planes by means of the "J" line system. All AA gun batteries opened fire at 0631 on the enemy bombers which were flying in an approximate Vee of Vee's with about 7 planes in the two leading Vees and 6 in the trailing Vee. The two rear Vees were slightly ragged in formation but the

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leading Vee was in good formation. Enemy bombers were single engine, two seater, low wing monoplanes flying a horizontal course and approaching EASTERN ISLAND from the northeast. Two (2) of these enemy bombers were shot down by the AA guns before bombs were dropped. Bombs were dropped in sticks shortly after AA fire was opened.

4.     Almost immediately following the high altitude bombing, dive bombers and straffing fighters attacked both islands. "D" battery was straffed by diving planes which appeared to be dive bombing but were evidently dive-straffing the battery. Our automatic weapons opened fire on the enemy straffers and dive bombers and are estimated to have shot down at least eight of the enemy planes and damaged an indeterminate number. Returning friendly aviation reported large numbers of enemy planes down on the water and damaged planes falling out about 20 miles from the island.

5.     The bombing and straffing continued for about seventeen (17) minutes until 0648 when all remaining enemy planes left the islands. At about 0701 "D" and "F" batteries again opened fire on one enemy plane flying to the south of the islands for about 20 seconds.

6.     An analysis of the action causes me to arrive at the following conclusions as to the Japanese method of attack:

(a) Facts: There was a clear sky with good visibility for AA firing. All personnel not manning AA guns or automatic weapons were in dugouts and well dispersed. AA and automatic weapons gunners were well protected by sandbag and cribbed sand emplacements.

(b) Tactics: The enemy appeared to be using their usual formation of 9 planes in a Vee, some of which had already been shot down by Marine fighter aircraft before AA batteries opened fire. The enemy continued their bombing run in spite of the AA fire and dropped their bombs in sticks along the north side of EASTERN ISLAND; and in the hangar and barracks area, and near "D" battery on SAND ISLAND. Objects definitely known to have been dive-bombed were the Eastern Island power house and the oil tanks near the Marine dock of Sand Island both of which were hit. The smoke from the burning oil tanks obscured the fire and observation of guns in that area to some extent.

   The dive bombing and low flying attack planes hit almost immediately after the high altitude bombs were dropped. Enemy planes were seen straffing a Marine flyer who had landed in the water near the reef.

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(c) When the enemy planes left the islands they were reported by radar as remaining in an area about 125 miles out on bearing 330 degrees for about 12 minutes before being lost by the radar. Some of the enemy planes appeared to have reconnaissance missions as evidenced by the finding of a camera in one plane shot down on Sand Island.

7.     Enemy Materiel: No duds have been found. Parts of two enemy planes which crashed were salvaged and turned over to the ONI. Both Browning and Lewis type air-cooled machine guns were found on the planes. Bombs dropped appeared to be 500 pounds and smaller fragmentation type; those on Eastern Island near the Marine Camp and on Sand Island near the power house apparently being set for a delay action forming very deep craters and exerting most of their force vertically. Bombs dropped near "D" battery were of the instantaneous fragmentation type with a small crater and a large lateral blast effect close to the ground. The fins were quite large on the bombs which landed near "D" battery, approximately comparable to our 500 pound bomb fins.

8.     The conduct of all personnel was highly satisfactory. All hands performed in a cool, efficient and magnificent manner and were only interested in knocking down as many of the enemy as possible. It is believed that our mission to protect the base facilities and rearming and refuelling of friendly aircraft was well carried out. It should be noted that no friendly planes were fired upon in spite of the large number and variety of planes that entered and left the area during daylight and darkness. The searchlight control stations did excellent work in the identification of friendly planes at great distances.

9.     In addition to the firing by AA gun batteries and the regular 37mm, 20mm and .50 caliber guns, each searchlight section manned one Lewis machine gun and the Battalion Command Post personnel off watch manned four (4) air-cooled .50 caliber guns on an improvised mount. It is generally agreed that the latter brought down at least one (l) and probably two (2) enemy planes and that the searchlight gunners may have brought down another.

10.     Ammunition Expenditure:

 The ammunition expenditure for this attack was as follows:

   1595 Shells, 3"AA, HE, M-42, w/30" fuze.

     21 Shells, 3"AA, HE, M-42, w/21" fuze.*

    670 Shells, 37mm, HE.

   3000 Shells, 20mm, HE.

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  3000 Shells, 20mm, tracer.

12,055 Rounds, .50 caliber, A.P.

 5,920 Rounds, .50 caliber, tracer.

 1,309 Rounds, .30 caliber, ball.

   305 Rounds, .30 caliber, A.P.

   345 Rounds, .30 caliber, tracer.

* Used with locally improvised open sights on 3"AA guns
  against dive bombers when "D" battery heightfinder was
  put out of action.

11.     In preparation for the attack all hands worked day and night in completing underwater obstacles, making anti-tank mines, installing new batteries, unloading ships, and improving old positions. Special mention should be made of the following:

(a) In addition to working on their own positions the Coast Artillery Group made and helped install large numbers of concertina-type reinforcing steel, underwater obstacles. Almost the entire beach line of the two islands had at least one line of these obstacles and the more likely landing beaches had two such lines.

(b) The 22d and 23rd Provisional Infantry Companies did excellent work unloading ships, distributing supplies, making and installing underwater obstacles, and helping make anti-tank mines in addition to their regular duties of beach patrolling and interior guard. In addition to the above duties, they carried on intensive night battle training. These companies are deserving of high praise for the willing manner in which they have assisted in all defensive preparations.

(c) "C" and "D" Companies, of the 2d Raider Battalion, did excellent work in the making of anti-tank mines, assisting the infantry in beach patrolling and unloading of ships, and manhandling of gasoline drums for refuelling of planes after the refuelling facilities were damaged by the bombing on Eastern Island.

(d) The AA and Special Weapons personnel of the Third Defense Battalion, temporarily attached, worked day and night unloading the ships and getting their guns ready for firing by the day after they arrived. In the eight days between their arrival and the attack, all guns were well emplaced, ammunition stowage constructed, and protection for personnel erected.

12.     Special Defensive Measures:

In addition to the underwater obstacles mentioned above, the following defensive items were constructed and laid:

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(a) Water mines: 380 controlled water mines consisting of a dynamite charge in water pipe with tarred field wire leads were laid along the north beach of Sand Island.

(b) Anti-personnel mines: Anti-personnel mines consisting of a 6-pound charge of dynamite enclosed on three sides by nails were laid around the entire beach perimeter of the island. The more probable landing beaches had two such strips of mines which could be set off either electrically or by firing rifles or machine guns at the dynamite charge on the inboard side of the mine.

(c) Anti-tank mines: 1500 contact anti-tank mines containing a 5-pound charge of dynamite and capable of being exploded by a 40-pound pressure were laid along the beaches most likely to be used for the landing of tanks.

(d) Anti-tank grenades: (Molotov cocktails): 310 "Victory" cocktails were prepared and distributed to gun positions and to the infantry for use against tanks.

13.     Personnel casualties:

 (a) Killed:

  Major William W. Benson, USMC.

  Corporal Frank LaN. Dupes, 274966, USMC.

 (b) Seriously Wounded -- Died of Wounds:

  Corporal Osa Currie, 274570, USMC.

  Private First Class Chauncey C. Lowe, 287348, USMC.

 (d) Not Seriously Wounded:

  Sergeant Stanley D. Greer, 293614, USMC.

  Corporal Randall H. Jolly, 232483, USMC, (3rd Def.Bn.)

  Private First Class Carl E. Fadick, 287990, USMC.

  Private First Class George R. Milsop, 278496, USMC.

  Private First Class William G. Oldfather, 284786, USMC,
    (3rd Def.Bn.)

  Private First Class Cleone B. Patterson, 328514, USMC.

  Private First Class DeWitt V. Smith, 323426, USMC.

  Private Charles E. Keenan, 320741, USMC, (3rd Def.Bn.)

  Private Joseph E. Love, 291975, USMC, (3rd Def.Bn.)

 (e) Shellshocked:

  Private George B. Gerdts, 328202, USMC.

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14.     Materiel Damage (U.S. Marine Corps):

 (a) Sand Island damage: "D" battery heightfinder tube was pierced by a bomb fragment, but can be repaired at Pearl Harbor. One 1900 azimuth instrument for 5" Artillery was destroyed on the hangar. No other damage to guns or positions.

 (b) Eastern Island damage:

   Marine galley and messhall destroyed with all
    equipment and fresh stores.

  Post Exchange and all Post Exchange supplies destroyed.
   Command post hit and switchboard and other communication
    equipment destroyed.

15.     Recommendations for awards has been covered in a separate letter to the Board of Awards, Pacific Fleet.

16. a.  There was no further action until the night of 4-5 June when a submarine fired on the island as follows:

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b.  Fire was not opened when submarine was first sighted as it was known that friendly submarines were operating near the island. The enemy submarine fired from 6 to 8 rounds, none of which hit the island. Baker Battery fired one (l) round of 5" HE, Cast Battery two (2) rounds of 5" star shell, Dog Battery thirty (30) rounds of 3" AA, HE, Easy Battery twelve (12) rounds of 3" Navy common at an average range of about 4,500 yards. Both "D" and "E" batteries were bracketing the target and three (3) hits were reported by SL#102.

c.  The submarine disappeared and was not again picked up either visually or by radar, in contrast to previous submarine attacks in which the submarine has been tracked on out after the attack.

d.  There was no damage to materiel or personnel casualties in this attack.